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This study examined individual choice behavior when it occurs in 
groups engaged in joint decision-making. Ninety-six subjects 
made binary choices between “risky” and “conservative” alterna- 
tives acting alone and acting as members of three-man groups 
in a series of 360 trials. The groups operated under the majority 
rule, unanimity, and the so-called “minimal quorum” rule. It was 
found that under unanimity and the minimal quorum rule there 
were strong pressures toward uniformity. However, individual 
members in these groups did not succumb to these pressures by 
modifying their overall choice preferences. Instead they arranged 
their sequences of choices so that the joint choice of all members 
would be congruent with their acceptable level of risk-taking. 
The findings also indicated that there was a slight shift toward 
conservatism when individuals joined groups. The results on 
individual risk-taking supported a parameter-free model, and the 
model also accommodated the present group data when some 
new assumptions were made about the effects of pressures toward 
uniformity. 
In studies of group decision-making it is often found that the group 
choice differs from the average of the individual members’ choices. This 
is especially true of studies on decisions made under uncertainty which 
involve risk. Normally, in these studies, first observed are choices of 
single individuals, who are then formed into groups for the purpose of 
coming to a joint decision. The decisions of these groups often seem to 
be at variance with the average of individual decisions. 
Two components of the difference between individual and group 
choices were previously distinguished (Zajonc, Wolosin, Wolosin & 
Sherman, 1968, 1969). First, it is possible that individual choice prefer- 
ences change when people act in groups. In fact, theories which attempt 
to explain the so-called “risky shift” phenomenon limit themselves almost 
exclusively to this component factor and seek to isolate its causes. One 
theory holds that in groups, responsibility for the decision can be dif- 
fused among the individuals ( Wallach, Kogan & Bern, 1964); others 
hold that the group provides the individuals with knowledge about 
cultural values regarding the alternatives (Brown, 1965; Stoner, 1968) ; 
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or that he becomes more familiar with the decision problem (Bateson, 
1966; Flanders & Thistlethwaite, 1967) ; or that some members are more 
influential than others (Clausen, 1965; Wallach, Kogan & Burt, 1968). 
Each of these theories assumes that if there is a change from individual 
to group decision-making, something happens to individual preferences 
for the choice alternatives when the choices are made jointly and in a 
group setting. 
The second component factor of the difference between individual 
and group decisions, which is independent of the first, focuses on the 
ways in which individual choices are combined to form a joint decision. 
A difference between the average of individual choices and the joint 
decision can be obtained without any change in individual preferences 
(Zajonc, Wolosin, Wolosin & Sherman, 1968). For instance, if there are 
two alternative courses of action, A and B, and if, on the average, the 
individual members’ preference of A is 70%, then a group composed of 
these individuals and observing the majority rule will choose A with a 
likelihood greater than .7, without any of the members changing their 
choice preferences. But if the group operates under unanimity then the 
likelihood of such a group choosing A is much smaller than .7. Various 
group decision schemes were compared by Smoke and Zajonc (1962) in 
terms of their formal properties, and it was clear from the analysis that 
a variety of discrepancies between the average of individual choices and 
the joint decision can be obtained all with the individual choice prefer- 
ences remaining constant. These discrepancies depend only on the group 
decision scheme. 
In all studies on risky shift known to the authors (including those 
carried out by them) these two components of the discrepancy between 
individual and group choices are allowed to vary simultaneously and are 
confounded. In some experiments the group is instructed to reach “con- 
sensus” as, for instance, in the early study by Wallach and Kogan (1965), 
and in others such requirement is not made explicit, although the group 
is expected to come up with a single choice nevertheless, The method of 
arriving at “consensus” or the single choice is usually left to the group. 
One believes that these groups generally observe the majority rule, but 
we have no hard information to support this conjecture. Hence, if 
change does occur, it is impossible to determine whether it occurred 
because of changes in individual choice preferences. because of a par- 
ticular decision scheme adopted, or because of an interplay between 
the two components. 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether changes in individual 
choice preferences do occur in groups when group decision schemes are 
strictly controlled. If we had control over the decision scheme which 
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combined the individual preferences of each member into a group de- 
cision it would be possible to separate the effects of pooling from the 
effects of group-produced changes in choice preferences. In the study 
reported here, individuals and groups are confronted with a two-choice 
situation where one event occurs twice as often as another and where a 
correct prediction of the rare event brings about a payoff that is twice 
as high as the payoff for a correct prediction of the frequent event. 
According to previous conventions, the prediction of the rare event con- 
stitutes a risky response while the prediction of the frequent event a 
conservative response. Groups which make decisions according to a 
majority rule are compared with groups which make decisions according 
to unanimity favoring risk (i.e., the infrequent event) or according to 
what has been previously called the “minimal quorum” (Smoke & Zajonc, 
1962). That is, in the first case the group as a whole makes a risky choice 
if more than half of its members make risky choices. In the second case 
the group as a whole makes a risky choice if and only if all members 
make risky choices, and a conservative choice otherwise. In the third 
case (minimal quorum) the group as a whole makes a risky choice if at 
least one member makes a risky choice. If no member chooses the rare 
event, the group decision favors the conservative alternative. 
A second purpose of this study is to provide a further validation for a 
model of group decision-making under risk presented earlier (Zajonc, 
Wolosin, Wolosin & Sherman, 1969). This parameter-free model was 
tested for two-choice situations with event probabilities of .6-.4 and 
.8-.2. It is of interest to determine whether the model represents a viable 
approach to the problem of group decisions by examining it under a 
new set of event probabilities, namely .67-33. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Ninety-six male undergraduates were recruited from the paid psychology subject 
pool at the University of Michigan. They were assigned randomly to four experi- 
mental groups. A minimum wage of $1.25/hr was guaranteed, When first contacted, 
subjects were told neither the purpose of the experiment nor that they could earn a 
greater sum of money during its course. 
Apparatus 
Two l/25 watt lights, mounted on a small panel, served to signal stimulus events. 
One was marked “1 cent,” and the other was marked “2 cents.” For half of the 
subjects, the left stimulus light was associated with the high payoff (and hence with 
the low probability of occurrence), and for the remainder, with the low payoff 
(and hence the high probability of occurrence). A punched tape program controlled 
the timing and sequence of stimulus events. Subjects were equipped with switches 
for making decisions and poker chips for recording their winnings. 
RISK-TAKING AND GROUP DECISION 19 
Design and Procechre 
All subjects were given 360 trials in two consecutive sets of 180 each. They 
were treated in an identical way during the first 180 trials. The two stimuli were 
programmed with .67 and .33 probabilities of occurrence. The payoff for the high- 
frequency light was 1 cent, and for the low-frequency light, the payoff was 2 cents. 
The sequence of stimuli was random with the constraint that these probabilities be 
observed within each block of 30 trials. 
Upon arriving at the laboratory, subjects were met by the experimenter and 
taken to individual cubicles where they worked alone for the first 180 trials. The 
following taped instructions were given to the subjects over an intercom: 
In front of you, yen see two lights. Every 7 set, one or the other will come on. 
You also see two response plates. During each 7-set interval, you are to press 
one plate or the other to anticipate which light will come on. If you press the 
left plate and the left light comes on, YOLI win 1 cent (2 cents). If you press 
the right plate and the right light comes on, you win 2 cents ( 1 cent). If you 
press one plate and the opposite light comes on, you win nothing. Also, if you 
fail to press within the 7-set interval you win nothing. 
You can keep track of your winnings with the chips which you see in front 
of you. If you win I cent by anticipating the left (right) light, place a white 
chip into your bank. If you win 2 cents by anticipating the right (left) light, 
place a blue chip into your bank. Your winnings will also be kept automatically. 
You are guaranteed a minimum of $1.25/hr and you may keep whatever you 
win over that amount; that is, you will get either $1.25/hr, or your winnings, 
whichever is more. 
Stimuli were presented every 7 set and, unlike the previous experiments, there were 
no rest periods between trial blocks. Blue chips were always associated with the 
high payoff light, and white chips with the low payoff light. 
The second set of 180 trials differed among the 4 treatments of the experiment. 
I-I Treatntent. At the end of the 180 trials. subjects in the Individual-Individual 
(I-I) treatment were told that the first part of the experiment was over. They were 
then taken out of their cubicles by the experimenter and allowed to relax for about 
3 or 4 min. However, they were not permitted to speak to one another. After the 
rest period, they were taken back to their cubicles and they continued as previously 
for another set of 180 trials. 
In the remaining treatments subjects worked in groups of three during the 
second set of 180 trials. 
I-Al Treatment. At the end of 180 trials, subjects in the Individual-Majority 
Vote (I-M ) treatment were told that the first part of the experiment was over. The 
experimenter then met all three subjects and led them to a room equipped with 
apparatus identical to that which they had used alone. Taped instructions were 
again issued over the intercom: 
Again you see the lights and the plates. Now you are working as a team that 
is making decisions as a group. This time, every 15 set one or the other light 
will appear. During this interval, each of you is to press one or the other of 
your plates indicating which light you have chosen, just as before. This time, 
however, you will also raise your hand so that everyone of you can see what 
the others have chosen. If you decide on the left light, press the left plate and 
raise your left hand. If you choose the right light, press the right plate and raise 
your right hand. 
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I will now tell you how your individual decisions combine to make a group 
decision. The light which is chosen by at least two of you is your group decision. 
For example, if two of you have picked the left light and one has picked the 
right, then the group decision is for the left light. If two of you pick the right 
light and one has picked the left, your group decision is for the right light. 
If your group decision is for left and the left light comes on, each of you 
wins I cent (2 cents). If your group decision is for the right, and the right 
light comes on, each of you wins 2 cents ( 1 cent). If your group decision is 
for one light and the other comes on, each of you wins nothing. Each man’s 
pay during this group session depends on the group’s decisions. None of you 
can win more than any other and either you all win or you all lose on every 
trial. Again you can keep track of your winnings by placing the appropriate 
chips into your bank. Are there any questions? 
I-MQ Treatment. Subjects in the Individual-Minimal Quorum (I-MQ) treat- 
ment were told at the end of the first 180 trials that the first part of the experiment 
was over. After they were ushered into their group room by the experimenter, in- 
structions similar to those from the I-M treatment were played, with the appropriate 
changes as follows: 
Again you see the lights and the plates. Now you are working as a team . . . I 
will now tell you how your individual decisions combine to make a group 
decision. If all three of you choose the left light, then the left light is your group 
decision. If at least one of you chooses the right light, then your group decision 
is for right. In other words, the only way for your group decision to he for the 
left light is if all three of you choose left. 
If your group decision is for left, and the left light comes on, each of you 
wins 1 cent. . . 
In this treatment, the group choice was for the risky alternative when any one 
of the three group members made such a vote. A conservative group choice could 
occur therefore only when all members voted the conservative alternative. 
I-U Treatment. In the Individual-Unanimity treatment (I-U), subjects were 
again placed into the group room after their initial 180 trials. These subjects heard 
the standard instructions. The instructions were modified to communicate that the 
group could make a risky choice if and only if all three members voted for the 
infrequent a1ternative.l 
In each of the above group conditions 180 trials separated by 15-set intervals 
were given. As previously, the probabilities were 2/3 and l/3 and they were ob- 
served for each block of 30 trials. 
The subiects were not oermitted to discuss their choices. but could talk about 
matters irrelevant to the task. Also, they were required to vote at the same time. 
Monitoring of the discussion over an intercom showed that the above constraints 
prevailed. 
1 Precisely, the difference between I-U and I-MQ is this: If A designates the high- 
frequency light and B the low-frequency light, then there are 4 combinations of 
3 individual choices: AAA, AAB, ABB, and BBB. In I-U, a group with the com- 
bination BBB would be the only one to vote for B, while groups with any of the 
other three combinations would be voting for A. In I-MQ, all combinations except 
AAA would result in a vote for B. 
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After the experimental session, an explanation of the experiment was given and 
subjects were paid their wages. 
RESUI,TS 
Individual and Group Choices 
Results are reported in percentages of risky choices. Table 1 shows 
these choices for the control (I-I) and the three experimental (I-U, 
I-MQ, and I-M) conditions for both sessions of the experiment. In the 
experimental conditions, scores during the first session were the average 
percentage of risky choices made by the group members individually, 
and in the second session, they were the percentage of group decisions 
for the risky alternative. As in our earlier studies, data from the control 
condition were aggregated into random sets of three-man statisticized 
“groups”; responses of these “groups” were averaged for both sets of 
180 trials. 
An analysis of variance was carried out with treatments as the 
between-subjects factor and trial blocks (with the sessions nested within 
blocks) as the within-subject factor. For the purposes of this analysis 
degrees of freedom in the error term were reduced because of the 
grouping of individual scores in the second session of the I-I condition. 
The analysis showed significant overall effects of trial blocks 
(F( 11,308) = 8.00, p < .OOl) and sessions (F( 1,308) = 52.50, p < 
.OOl). There was also a significant interaction between treatments and 
sessions ( F (3,308) = 4.38, p < ,001). All groups showed declines in risk- 
taking (i.e., shifts in the conservative direction). The smallest decline 
occurred in the I-MQ treatment, while the largest decline was shown 
by I-U groups. 
Because of the significant interaction between sessions and treatments, 
simple effects tests (as outlined by Winer, 1962, pp. 310-311) were 
TABLE 1 










I-I (Individual-Individual) 46.1 i17.7 37.7 
I-M (Individual-Majority) 44.7 41.4 30.0 
I-U (Individual-Unanimity) 47.6 4’2.2 34.7 
I-M& (Individual-Minimal Quorum) 45.2 33.2 42.4 
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carried out. These tests showed that choices in the first session differed 
significantly from choices in the second session (at the .Ol level or better) 
in the I-M and I-U treatments, but also in the control (I-I) treatment.’ 
Only in the I-MQ treatment was the decline in risk-taking nonsignifi- 
cant. Furthermore, the 4 treatments did not differ among themselves for 
the first 180 trials ( F( 3,21) < 1.00) ; the differences among them in the 
second session are only marginally significant ( F( 3,21) = 2.56, .lO > 
p > .05). 
Table 1 also shows percentages of risky choices made by individuals 
when in groups. These data were analyzed by analysis of variance simi- 
lar to the one described above and including the first 180 trials, except 
that the error term maintained its full number of degrees of freedom. 
As before, significant effects for trial blocks (F( 11,1012) = 10.62, 
p < .OOl) and sessions (F( 1,1012) = 83.24, p < .OOl) occurred, and 
there was a significant interaction between sessions and treatments 
(F(3,1012) = 5.41, p < .OOl). 
Simple effects tests were carried out. They indicate that while indi- 
vidual choices in the first session did not vary significantly as a function 
of treatment (F( 3,92) < 1.00)) they did vary significantly in the second 
half of the experiment ( F( 3,92) = 6.68, p < .Ol). We note from Table 1 
that within experimental treatments, substantial decreases in average risk- 
taking occurred. These changes were greatest in the I-MQ treatment 
(F( lJO12) = 28.54, p < .OOl), somewhat smaller but still significant 
in the I-U treatment (F( lJO12) = 5.49, p < .05), and least of all in 
the I-M treatment (F( 1,1012) = 2.25, ns). On the other hand, there 
was a significant decline in risk in the control (I-I) treatment 
(F( lJO12) = 13.75, p < .OOl), 
Group Decision Schemes 
It will be of interest to examine the present data in the light of the 
decision model presented in the earlier publication (Zajonc et at., 1969). 
This parameter-free model assumes that, given two alternative events, 
A and B, occurring with the probabilities p(A) and p( B ) with p(A) > 
p(B), the individual can find himself at the onset of any trial in any of 
three mutually exclusive states: (a) he is certain that A will occur and 
equally certain that B will not occur; (b) he is certain that B will occur 
‘The reason why there is a significant difference between the first and second 
180 trials even in the I-I condition is that during the early trials individual choices 
hover around 50% before reaching an asymptote which is roughly the one that is 
maintained during the second 180 trials. Total rather than asymptotic performance 
was observed during the first 180 trials so that the data from the first and the 
second 180 trials can be based on the same number of observations. 
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and equally certain that A will not occur; (c) he is uncertain which of 
the two events will occur. These three states can be simply called A, B, 
and A U B. An individual’s probability of being in a given state is 
assumed to correspond to the objective probability of the given event. 
Thus, for example, his probability of being in state A, P(A), is equal 
to the probability that A will occur times the probability that B will not 
occur; his probability of being in state B, P(B), is the converse; and his 
probability of being in state A U B, P( A U B), is the remainder. For 
the .67-.33 event probabilities used in the present experiment P(A) = 
p(A)[(l --p(B)] = .44; P(B) = p(B)[(l --p(A)] = .ll; and P(A U 
B) = 1 - P(A) + P(B) = .45. 
As in previous experiments, in the present one the subjects are required 
to predict either A or B and they cannot declare uncertainty. Hence, 
states A and B are stable, and when in these states the individual will 
make the response “A” or “B,” respectively, before the trial terminates. 
But A U B is unstable, and the rules of the experiment require him to 
move from A U B to another of two states, A or B. It is thus assumed 
that the individual who is in state A U B at the onset of the trial will 
move to A or to B. For reasons discussed in the previous publication, the 
probabilities of moving to A or to B from A U B are not proportional 
to the probabilities associated with the events A or B. but they are pro- 
portional to the payoffs associated with these events. Hence, in the 
present case the individual who is in A U B will move twice as often 
to B than to A because the payoff for B is 2 cents and for A only 1 cent. 
Table 2 shows the initial and terminal probabilities for the various states 
in the present experiment. 
It can be seen from the above table that the model predicts 40.7% 
risky (i.e., B) choices when they are made individually. Actually, in the 
last 90 trials of the first session, which represent individual asymptotic 
Individual state on 
n given trial Initial stage Terminal stage 
1.0 
A ,444 L .5x; 
.:33 / 
A (,’ I3 ,445 y 
\.67 
13 ,111 Y.407 
1.0 
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performance, there were 41.7, 44.9, 44.5, and 42.9% risky choices for the 
I-M, I-U, I-MQ, and I-I treatments, respectively. These values average 
to 43.5% risky choices, a figure not too far removed from that predicted 
by the model. 
According to the decision rules required in the I-MQ and I-U treat- 
ments the model would predict 1 - .5933 = .792 risky choices in the 
I-MQ treatment and .4073 = 967 risky choices in the I-U treatment. For 
the I-M treatment we would have to predict that the group makes a 
risky choice when either all three group members are in state B (which 
is equal to .067) or when two of them are in state B and one in state A 
(which is equal to .296). Hence, the probability that the group will 
choose the risky alternative when operating under the majority rule is 
predicted to be .363. 
This last figure is again quite close to the one obtained in the I-M 
treatment, namely .39 (see Table 1). A conservative shift is predicted 
by the model when the group operates by the majority rule, and such a 
shift is obtained. The predictions for the I-MQ and I-U treatments, 
however, are utterly incorrect. The predicted probability of risky choices 
of ,792 overestimates the I-MQ performance by nearly forty points, and 
the predicted probability of .067 risky choices underestimates the ob- 
tained performance of I-U groups by nearly thirty points. 
How can these discrepancies be explained? Two possibilities exist. 
First, we can assume that individual choice preferences remain stable 
when subjects move from the alone condition to groups operating under 
the majority rule. But they change dramatically when individuals move 
to groups operating under unanimity or quorum. This conjecture, how- 
ever, is contradicted by the evidence. It is seen in Table 1 that there is 
indeed a drop in risky choices for individuals going into I-MQ groups. 
But the change is negligible for individuals joining I-U groups. More- 
over, the drop in individual risk-taking in the I-MQ treatment is not 
sufficient to explain the obtained results in this treatment. Since 33.2% 
of individual choices are risky choices (see Table l), then we would 
expect in the I-MQ condition 1 - (1 - .332)” = .702 such group 
choices. This figure is somewhat smaller than the .792 predicted by the 
initial probabilities but still quite out of the range of the data. 
The answer must lie, therefore, in the frequencies with which the 
various combinations of individual choices occur in the group setting. 
There are four such group states, AAA, AAB, ABB, and BBB, where 
each letter represents the terminal state in which one of the group mem- 
bers finds himself on the given trial. We assumed that the individuals 
make their decisions independently of others when in groups, and this 
assumption was tenable for the previous experiments on individual and 
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group risk-taking and for the present I-M treatment, and even if it was 
not tenable, the predictions made under this assumption were not far 
from the observed results. But it is clearly not tenable for the I-U and 
I-MQ treatments. Table 3 shows the proportion of trials on which the 
four group states occurred in the four treatments and their predicted 
proportions when independence of choices is assumed and the choices 
are predicted by the terminal probabilities given by the parameter-free 
model. 
It can be seen from Table 3 that there are indeed striking departures 
from the expected probabilities in the I-U and I-MQ treatments. These 
departures are in the direction of increased occurrence of unanimities. 
The model predicts that there would be 27% unanimities, 29% favoring 
the frequent and 7% favoring the infrequent alternative. In the I-M 
treatment there is a tendency for these unanimities to be somewhat 
larger. However, in the I-U and I-MQ treatments these unanimities 
occur with an overwhelming frequency. In the I-U groups we have 84% 
and in I-MQ we have 83% unanimities, which are far above the ex- 
pected percentages. It is also seen from Table 3 that the unanimities in 
the I-U groups favor the risky alternative more than they do in the 
I-MQ groups. It is therefore in this manner that the groups can maintain 
a level of risk-taking which the individual members consider acceptable, 
and which do not require the individuals to drastically change their own 
choice preferences. 
DISCUSSION 
As in the previous study on risk-taking in a two-choice situation 
(Zajonc et al., 1968) in which the probabilities of the two alternatives 
were .6 and .4, the present experiment demonstrated a shift toward 
conservatism. But the significance of this shift is somewhat ambiguous 
because the I-I subjects also decreased their level of risk-taking during 
the second 180 trials. The parameter-free model was found again to 
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predict individual risk-taking fairly reasonably. Also successful was the 
prediction to group risk-taking when the groups operated under the 
majority rule. The model predicted a conservative shift for I-M groups 
and a conservative shift did occur that was numerically not far removed 
from the predicted value. But, the data from the I-U and I-MQ treat- 
ments bore no resemblance to the predicted values. 
Of course, it would be quite surprising if the parameter-free model 
did make accurate predictions for the I-U and the I-MQ cases. It 
would not be expected that individuals who settled on about 40% of 
risk-taking would accept 7% when they join a group working under 
the unanimity principle, or 80% when they work under minimal quorum 
rule. In fact, one of the purposes of introducing these treatments was 
to discover departures from the parameter-free model which would 
allow us to search for useful parameters. 
It was initially expected that these parameters would pertain to the 
individual choice behavior, because that is where the main changes 
were anticipated. But we note that there were no dramatic changes in 
individual choice preferences when these choices were made in groups. 
While there was indeed some decline in individual choice preferences 
for the risky alternative in the three group treatments, this decline was 
not significant in groups reaching decisions by majority rule, and it was 
no larger than among subjects continuing to make decisions individually 
in I-U and I-MQ treatments. 
The data then offer an indication that the individual members are 
quite resistant to changing their choice preferences. And when the indi- 
vidual maintains his choice preference the majority scheme leaves him 
with group choices that are not far removed from his own. He chooses 
the risky alternative 40.7% of the time when working alone, and a strict 
majority rule, with group members choosing independently of each 
other, predicts 36.3% risky choices made by the group. This represents 
less than a 5% shift, a change which is evidently quite tolerable. There 
must be a range of risk-taking which the person finds acceptable, 
whether he works alone or in groups. If he wants to remain within this 
range of risky choices when in a group which reaches decisions by 
unanimity, he must adjust his voting behavior. He can no longer predict 
his A’s and B’s as previously because other things held constant, the 
probability of a three-man group reaching a unanimous decision that 
favors the risky alternative is .43, which is very low indeed.” 
3 The majority scheme causes a minimal departure from the average of individual 
preference only when the group is quite small. For the present probabilities, .67 
and .33, a group of seven would vote by majority for the rare alternative only 30% 
of the time, and a group ten times as large would be extremely unlikely to vote for 
it at all. 
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It appears from the results that not only does the individual maintain 
his own choice preference within a narrow range when in a group, but 
somehow his group generates joint decisions which also lie within the 
range of risk acceptable to him. Table 3 reveals how this consequence is 
achieved. It is significant that the sums of the AAA and AAB states are 
fairly similar across the various treatments. The sum of the proportions 
of these two states as predicted by the parameter-free model is .63. The 
proportions obtained for the I-M, I-U, and I-MQ treatments were .61, 
59, and .67. Of course, in the I-M treatment this sum consists of .27 
for the AAA state and 34 for the AAB state, while we have .49 for AAA 
and .lO for AAB in the I-U groups, and .58 for AAA and .09 for AAB in 
the I-MQ groups. Similar effects obtain for the sums of the BBB and 
ABB states. It would appear, therefore, that in groups operating under 
unanimity and under the minimal quorum, when there are two choices 
for a given alternative, the probability of the third choice favoring that 
alternative is enhanced. 
Let us first look at the I-U treatment. For any subject who has not yet 
made a decision, the probability that the two remaining group members 
have both chosen the infrequent alternative is, according to the pre- 
dicted terminal probability, .40? = -17. His own probability of being 
in state B is .407. Simply suppose that he is the last to vote one third of 
the time. Suppose further that when last and when the other two mem- 
bers have both voted B he will always vote B. Since he doesn’t wish to 
abandon his own individual choice preference, which according to the 
model is .407, he will be able to contribute only $2 of his B-votes, because 
he is third only $$ of the time. We have .17 + $5 (.407) = .31. The data 
show a value .04 higher. 
It should be noted at this point that as in the I-U treatment, there is 
pressure toward unanimity in the I-MQ treatment as well. Here the 
group choice is for B unhs all vote for A. In these groups it is the likeli- 
hood of the conservative choice which would be depressed to about .2 had 
all three members retained their independence and their initial choice 
preferences. If this level of conservatism is too low, or putting it other- 
wise, if the resulting level of group risk is beyond the acceptable range, 
there will be pressure on the individual who hasn’t yet voted and who is 
confronted by two A votes to vote for A also. That such pressures toward 
unanimity exist is clearly evident from Table 3. The I-U treatment has 
the greatest proportion of BBB states and the I-MQ treatment has the 
largest proportion of AAA states. 
Let us then proceed with the I-MQ treatment in the same way as we 
did in the case of the I-U treatment. The likelihood of two members 
voting A when the third has not yet made up his mind is .593” = 35. 
Adding one third of the individual’s own A votes, or ys (.593) we have 
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.55. This would be the predicted incidence of AAA states. The observed 
proportion of these states in the I-MQ treatment is not far removed, .58. 
The proportion of B group choices in the I-MQ treatment is strictly de- 
pendent on the proportion of AAA group states, because, according to 
the minimal quorum rule, the group votes B when at least one of its 
members votes for B. The predicted proportion of B group choices for 
the I-MQ treatment is thus 1 - 55 = .45, which exceeds the data by .03. 
It is of interest to note from Table 3 that the tendency toward un- 
animity generalizes to the irrelevant alternative as well. In the I-U 
treatment it is quite immaterial whether there are many or few AAA 
occurrences in the group. Yet the data show that in this treatment the 
preponderance of AAA states exceeded the expected value by a con- 
siderable margin. The same is true of the BBB states in the I-MQ treat- 
ment. Here it is also inconsequential whether there are many or few BBB 
states. Yet the proportion of these states in the I-MQ groups was .25, 
which exceeds chance expectations by .I& 
To summarize then, the individual who finds himself a part of a joint 
decision team does not seem to be ready to abandon his idiosyncratic 
preferences. Nor is he ready to allow the group of which he is a member 
to make decisions which would deviate significantly from his own pref- 
erences. This seems to be the case where this is quite difficult as, for 
instance, in groups that operate under the unanimity rule. The individual 
solves his problems by a judicious distribution of his choices over trials. 
AI1 members of the group gauge their behavior so as to maximize un- 
animity when unanimity is the criterion of the group choice. We noted 
that in the I-U and the I-MQ treatments there were 84% and 83% of 
trials with unanimous choices. The remaining trials are apparently left 
for individuals to recapture their own idiosyncratic preferences. Thus 
the person gives up very little by joining the group that works under 
unanimity or the minimal quorum: he attempts to maintain his previous 
choice preference and he only abandons the freedom of selecting the 
trials on which he votes for A or B. Of course, in groups operating under 
majority rule he needn’t abandon either his idiosyncratic choice prefer- 
ences or the sequential pattern of these choices over trials. One should 
not mistake these pressures toward unanimity for conformity. It is quite 
clear that the individual does not give up the independence of his 
choices-only the timing of these choices. Wallach and Mabli ( 1970), 
using the standard choice dilemmas, also found little evidence of con- 
formity effects in group risk taking. It should be noted, however, that 
other studies do indicate some tendencies toward uniformity or con- 
formity, as there usually is a restriction of variance when individuals 
move from the solitary to the group condition. 
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Because the majority rule affords the person not only the freedom to 
retain his idiosyncratic choice preferences but also the freedom to select 
the occasions on which he will exercise one preference or another, it 
would seem that a group free to determine its own decision scheme would 
lock in 011 the majority process. In a recent study on binary choices in 
groups, Davis, Hornik, and Hornseth (1970), have found that while the 
majority scheme is indeed among the preferred ones, groups they ob- 
served are sufficiently flexible so as to allow themselves to function on 
some occasions by other schemes as well. 
Because a different decision task than that conventionally used in 
risky shift studies was examined in the present experiment, one should be 
cautious in attempting to generalize to group processes occurring when 
individuals work with choice dilemmas. Nonetheless, on the basis of 
these results there is also cause to doubt whether risky shifts (or con- 
servative shifts) obtained with conventional materials can be explained 
entirely in terms of changes in individual risk preferences with rules 
whereby these individual preferences are combined into a joint choice 
totally ignored. 
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